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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
0 .. A. T..:\_l\GREN, ETC., 
vs. 
ADELIXE 11. INGALLS 
A\DELIXE M. INGALLS 
vs. 
124252 
i\jJERil 1 ~:\N SAVINGS & LOAN 
.:\~N'N, et al 124797 
.. \DELIXE ~L INGALLS 
vs. 
P_BlTDENTIAL FEDER.AL SAV-
IX<iS & LOAN ASS'N, et al 124798 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9297 
Respondent does not controvert the statement of 
facts of appellant but is of the opinion that a statement 
in chronological order n1ay be helpful to the Court. 
On __._~pril 2, 1959 the respondent, Adeline M. Ingalls, 
and Ben Ste,vart opened a joint savings account, #45889, 
'vith Prudential Federal Savings and L·oan Association 
and entered into a written contract as follows: 
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The undersigned hereby apply for a member-
ship and for a savings share account in the Pru-
dential Federal Savings and Loan Association 
and for the issuance of evidence of membership 
in the approved form in the joint names of the 
undersigned as joint tenants with the right of 
survivorship and not as tenants in common. Re-
ceipt is hereby acknowledged and a copy of the 
charter and by-laws of s.aid association. Speci-
mens of the signatures of the undersigned are 
shown below and the association is hereby author-
ized to act without further inquiry in accordance 
with writings bearing any such signature; it be-
ing understood and agreed that any of the under-
signed who shall first act shall have power to 
act in all matters related to the membership and 
any share account in said association held by 
the undersigned, whether the other person or per-
sons named in the certificate be living or not. 
The repurchase or redemption value of any such 
share account or other rights relating thereto 
may be paid or delivered in whole or in part to 
any one of the undersigned who shall first act, 
and such payment or delivery of a receipt or 
acquittance signed by any one of the undersigned 
shall be a valid and sufficient release and dis-
charge of said asocation. ('c·ase #124 798, pages 
1 and 12.) 
On the same day the same persons opened a joint 
savings account with American Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation, #OS-14673, and made a contract as follows: 
As Joint Tenants with right of survivorship 
and not as tenants in common, and not as tenants 
by the entirey, the undersigned hereby apply for 
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a 1ne1nbership and a withdrawable account in the 
.A.MF~R lCAN SA \:INGS & LOAN ASSO·CIA-
TI 0 N", san1e to be issued subject to the· provisions 
of the Laws under which the Association is or-
ganized and operating and the Articles of Incor-
poration and By-laws of the Ass·ociation. 
You are directed to act pursuant to any one 
or more of the joint tenants' signatures, shown 
below, in any manner in connection with this 
account and to pay without an liability for such 
payment, to any one or the survivor or survivors 
at any time. It is agreed by the signatory parties 
with each other and by the parties with you that 
any funds placed in or added to the account by 
any one of the parties is and shall be conclusively 
intended to be a gift at that time of such funds t'o 
the other signatory party or parties to the extent 
of his or their pro rata interest in the account. 
(Case #124 797, pages 1, 4, and 16.) 
On February 7, 1960 Ben Stewart, one 'Of the joint 
tenants named in said joint accounts, died. Thereafter, 
0. A. Tangren, the appellant, was appointed executor 
of the estate of Ben Stewart. On the date of the death 
of Ben Stewart there was on deposit in the aceount with 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association the 
sun1 of $10,000, and on deposit on account with American 
Savings & Loan Association he sum of $10,247.09, 
'Yhich sums have since been deposited with the Clerk of 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Case #124797, 
pages 2 and 16; case #124 798, pages 2. and 12.) 
On February 4, 1960, three days prior to the death 
of Ben Ste,vart, an action was filed in the District Court 
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of Salt Lake ·County on behalf of Ben Stewart against 
the respondent. The Plaintiff sought an adjudication 
that the accounts referred to herein were his property, 
free and clear of any claim :of the resp·ondent. At about 
the same time Ben Stewart caused a letter to be sent 
to each of the loan companies, as follows: 
You "\\7ill please take notice that when I had 
Adeline 1\1. Ingalls name placed on my savings 
account "\vith you, #--------------------, I little realized 
that I was placing her in a position equal to 
myself with respect to said account. I never in-
tended that that should happen. I therefore di-
rect that you do not let the said Adeline M. Ingalls, 
or any one on her behalf, withdraw any funds 
from that account. I am taking proper measures 
to have her name removed from the account." 
(Case #124252, page 1; case #124798, pages 10 
and 11, an dcase #12-±797 pages 6 and 15.) 
Respondent commenced separate actions on March 
16, 1960 against each of the loan companies and the 
appellant for the purpose of recovering the funds on 
depusit in said joint accounts. F:or convenience, the 
action commenced by Ben Stewart will be called the 
Stewart action and the actions commenced by the re-
spondent will be called the Ingalls actions. (·Case #124797, 
page 3 ; case #124 798, page 3.) 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in the Stewart 
action, and in the Ingalls actions filed n1otions to dis-
Iniss the counterclaims of the appellant and motions for 
su1nmary judgment. These motions "~ere consolidated 
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for hearing and argued before the Honorable Merrill 
C. Faux on l\Iay 31, 1960. On June 10, 19·60 an order 
for dismissal was entered in the Stewart action and 
orders dis1nissing the counterclaims of the appellant 
were entered in the Ingalls actions, with provisions in 
eaeh case that the appellant could amend within ten days. 
(Case #124252, pages 12-18.) No amendment was made. 
Consequently, on June 21, 1960 an order dismissing the 
Ste,Yart action was entered, and in the Ingalls actions 
summary judgments were entered in favor of R.esp:ond-
ent, and orders dismissing the counterclaims of Appellant 
"\Vere entered. This appeal is from the orders of June 10, 
1960 and June 21, 1960. (Case #124 797, pages 26-31 ; 
case #124 798, pages 32, 33 and 35-38.) 
STAT'EMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
A CONCLUSIVE PRESUMP'TION O·F INTENTION TO 
CREATE A JOINT TENANCY IN THE FUNDS IN QUES-
TION APPLIES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT. 
POINT II. 
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMEN'T IS NOT DE-
STROYED BY THE NOTICE TO THE LOAN ·COMPANIES. 
POINT III. 
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMENT IS UNIMPAIRED 
BY THE STEW ART ACTION. 
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A CONCLUSIVE PRESUMP'TION OF INTENTION TO 
CREAT·E A JOINT T.ENANCY IN THE FUNDS IN QUES-
TION APPLIES IN FAVOR OF 'THE RESPONDENT. 
This Court has dealt with joint bank aceounts in 
the following cases: Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P. 
2d 715; Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327; 
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. 2d 194; First 
Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Demiris, 354 P. 2d 97. 
In Holt v. Bayles the parties executed a joint tenancy 
agreement card and left it with the bank. The agreement 
contained all the essentials of joint tenancy. After the 
death of one of the joint tenants the survivor withdrew 
the funds and the action was between a representative 
of the estate of the deceased joint tenant and the sur-
viving j'Oint tenant. This Court held in favor of the 
survivor and stated, on page 718 of 39 P. 2d: 
Where there is a joint agreement executed 
by the parties "\Yhich clearly declares the inten-
tion to create a joint interest of each in the 
deposit or credit, the courts will sustain such 
intention thus expressed, especially where the 
contract is not attacked for fraud, mistake inca-
pacity, or other infirmity. The plaintiffs have 
made no such attack on the instrument before us, 
but merely say that it is lacking in substance to 
·create a joint tenancy or joint ownership in the 
dep-osit with right of survivorship. With this 
contention we cannot agree, since the language is 
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elPar and explicit as expressing an intention to 
do that very thing .... 
\V e do not regard the question of the original 
ownership of the money as controlling under the 
particular facts of this case. 
The Court stated further, on page 719: 
Where such intention is clearly expressed in 
a written contract executed by the parties, whi'ch 
remained unaltered, and there is no fraud, undue 
influence, mistake, or other infirmity alleged, the 
question of intention ceases to be an issue and 
the courts are bound by the agreement. In such 
cases the delivery to and p'Ossession of the pass-
book is not determinative of ownership of the 
account, since possession 'Of the book is ordinarily 
in one of the parties, not both at the same time, 
and delivery to one must, in the nature of things, 
be a delivery t'O both.'' 
And again on page 719 the Court stated: 
In many states joint deposits are regulated 
by statute, under which the survivor is entitled 
to the fund without regard to the prior ownership 
or title to the property. The controlling ques-
ion involved is the intention of the parties making 
the deposit, and not its mere form. Where such 
intention is evidenced by a written agreement 
this queston of intention ceases to be an issue, 
and the courts are bound by the agreement. 
The rule of Holt vs. Bayles has been referred to in 
later Utah cases as a conclusive presumption of intention 
in the creation of a joint tenancy. Thus, in Neill v. Royce, 
supra, the conclusive presumption of Holt v. Bayles was 
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recognized, but as both parties to the joint tenancy agree-
ment were alive the Court held that the presumption 'vas 
not conclusive during the joint lives of the parties, but 
until the death of one of the parties was rebuttable and 
could be overcome by clear and convincing proof to the 
contrary. The Cuurt also held that the p,roof submitted 
in that particular case did not overcome the presumption. 
Likewise, in Greener v. Greener, where both parties to 
the agreemnt were alive, this Court followed Holt v. 
Bayles but with the limitation as in Neill v. Royce. How-
ever, in the Greener case it was held that the proof was 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of joint tenancy. 
Again, in the very recent Demiris case the Court states, 
"We are not here disagreeing with the ruling in the case 
of Hult v. Bayles." The doctrine of Holt v. Bayles is 
firmly established in this State. 
The instant case falls within the rule of Holt v. 
Bayles. The agreement cards signed by the parties at the 
time of making the deposits contained the essential ele-
ments of a joint tenancy agreement and clearly declared 
their intention to create a joint tenancy in the funds in 
question. Therefore, under the rule of Holt v. Bayles, 
upon the death of Ben Stewart and in the absence of 
fraud, mistake and undue influence, discussion of which 
appears in Point III, the conclusive presumption of in-
tention to create a true joint tenancy became operative 
and ownership of the funds vested in Respondent as sur-
viving joint tenant. 
POINT II. 
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMEN'T IS NOT DE-
STROYED BY THE NOTICE TO THE LOAN COMP ANTES. 
The affect of notice to the loan companies is capably 
treated in the leading case of Moskowitz v. Marrow, 167 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
N. E. 506; 66 A. L. R. 870, the facts being as follows: On 
April :2S, 1 ~):2-t Fannie 1\fanheimer was the o'vner of sub-
stantial deposits in her individual name in four accounts. 
On that date she n1ade a transfer of the funds in each of 
the four banks creating deposits jointly with herself and 
l'Parl I-Iarris, her granddaughter. The passbooks were 
delivered to the granddaughter. On December 5, 1924 
Fannie delivered a writing to each of the four banks, 
notifying each of them that the privilege granted by her 
to Pearl to withdraw any money from any account was 
revoked and instructed the banks to honor no signature 
other than her own for withdrawal. In January, 1925, 
Fannie withdrew the deposits in two of the banks and re-
deposited them to the credit of herself individually. In 
April, 1925 the accounts in the latier two banks were 
reestablished in the joint names of herself and Pearl, 
payable to the survivor. On May 4, 1925 Fannie died. The 
contest is between the executor of her estate and Pearl as 
to the ownership of the funds in the bank accounts. The 
lower eourt held with respect to the two accounts which 
had been reestablished in the joint names that the sur-
vivor was entitled to such deposits but with respect to 
the two accounts which had not been disturbed after the 
notice had been given to the banks the survivor was not 
entitled to those accounts for the reason that the notice 
,,,.as effectual to revoke the joint tenancy arrangement. 
The appellant court, however, held that the survivor was 
entitled to the funds in all of the accounts and that the 
notice did not destroy the right of the· survivor to the 
funds. Justice Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion. With 
respect to the affect of notice, Justice Cardoza says, on 
page 880 of 66 A.L.R. : 
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The tenancy, if joint in its creation, was 
not destroyed by revocation. Cf. Kelly v. Beers, 
supra, 194 N. Y. at page 58, 128 Am. St. Rep. 
543, 86 N. E. 980. If the form of the deposit was 
an expression of the true agreement, there could 
be no change of ownership thereafter by an ex 
parte declaration ; 
and on page 881 : 
A notice of revocation is not a notice of lis pen-
dens. 
Further, on page 881: 
·To put it differently, title to the accounts 
was unaffected by the notice of withdrawal in the 
absence of a showing that by implication, if not 
otherwise, the privilege of withdrawal was one 
of the terms of the deposit. Such a showing was 
permissible during the joint liv·es, for it was then 
opposed by nothing except a presumption to the 
contrary. It was no longer permissible after 
either depositor was dead, for it was then opposed 
by a presumption declared to be conclusive. 
POINT III. 
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMENT IS UNIMPAIRED 
BY THE STEW ART ACTION. 
The rule in Holt v. Bayles is conditioned upon there 
being no fraud, mistake, or undue influence. Appellant 
claims neither fraud nor undue influence, but, on page 7, 
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asserts that thiH case should be distinguished from Holt v. 
l~ayles by the filing of the Stewart action in which the 
complaint contains allegations of lack of donative intent, 
mistake, and original ownership of the funds in the plain-
tiff. 
Although Appellant asserts ownership of the fund 
as one of the distinctions between this case and Holt v. 
Bayles, the allegation of the complaint falls short of as-
serting ownership in the plaintiff. The complaint states: 
The said Adeline M. Ingalls has never put 
any funds into either of the said savings accounts 
and this plaintiff was not, nor is he now, obligated 
to the said Adeline M. Ingalls in any sun1 or 
amount. 
If original ownership of the funds were an issue, the 
fact is that the funds in question were created through 
the joint efforts of Ben Stewart and his wife, who pre-
deceased him, who is the mother of Respondent. However, 
ownership of the funds is no distinction as the deceased 
joint tenant in Holt v. Bayles was the original owner of 
the funds. The Court stated with respect thereto: 
We do not regard the question of the original 
ownership of the money as controlling under the 
particular facts of this case. 
If mistake is alleged in the Stewart complaint it is 
no basis for distinction. The complaint alleges: 
That at the time plaintiff placed the name of 
said Adeline M. Ingalls on said pass books he did 
not know or realize that by doing so he was· plac-
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ing his said savings account at the disposal of the 
said Adeline M. Ingalls or that he was placing her 
in a position where she would inherit all of said 
accounts upon his death or that he was placing 
himself in a position that he could not dispose of 
the said accounts by will or other disposition. 
Obviously the foregoing is not an allegation of mis-
take of fact, but merely an allegation of mistake of law, 
and as such is no ground for relief. The general rule is 
stated in 17 'C.J.S. 500: "A mistake of law will not invali-
date a contract." 
This ·Court, in Board of Education v. Board of Edu-
cation, 85 Utah 276, 39 P.2d 340 quoted with approval 
from 13 C.J. 379 : 
The author says that it is laid down in gener-
allanguage in many cases that a mistake, in order 
that it may affect a contract, must be a mistake 
of fact, and that a mere mistake of law will not 
affect the enforceability of an agreement, and that 
a mistake of law is where the person knows the 
facts of the case but is ignorant of the legal con-
sequences. 
The third distinction asserted by Appellant is lack 
of donative intent. The allegation of the complaint in this 
regard is: 
He never intended that the said Adeline 
M. Ingalls should have an inheritable interest to 
all of said savings accounts. That since the plac-
ing of her name on said puss books this plaintiff 
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has given said Adeline M. Ingalls approximat~ely 
the sum of $4,000.00, which is the full amount he 
intended for her to have of his estate. 
Appellant apparently relie~ upon the Demir is case 
as authority for this point, as he states that it "held that 
a joint bank account was not created because the decedent 
had not intended to create the same." 
The Demiris case is not subject to the si1npiification 
Appellant would desire. The age, physical and 1nental 
condition of the decedent at the time of the creation of 
the joint account, the marital background, the claim of 
the exercise of undue influence on the decedent by his 
\vife, and the alleged wrongful act of the wife in the with-
drawal of the funds, were all involved in the Demiris case. 
Certainly the Demiris case is no authority for the pro-
position that a joint tenancy may be avoided solely by 
lack of intent to create the same. The real basis for the 
holding of the Demiris case was not lack of intent on the 
part of the decedent but the wrongful act of the surviving 
joint tenant in ursurping the funds. !The majority opinion 
stated, on page 99 of 354 P .2d 
We are in accord with the doctrine that \vhen 
the wife withdrew all of the funds fro1n the ac-
count in the lifetime of her husband, obviously 
for the purpose of getting possession for herself, 
with the intention of wrongfully deprtving him 
of his rights therein, her action was inimical to 
the relationship that exists between joint tenants 
and this act violative of the relationship· rendered 
the question as to the true ownership open to 
determination. (Emphasis ours.) 
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Justice Ilenroid, who wrote a separate opinion, thought 
the holding should be based upon undue unfluence of the 
surviving joint tenant. 
The allegation of lack 'Of intent is in the nature of 
a unilateral mistake, which affords no basis for relief. 
The author, in 12 Am. Jur, page 624, says: 
It has been declared that if, in the expression 
of the intention of one of the parties to an alleged 
contract, there is error, and that error is unknown 
to, and unsuspected by, the other party, that which 
was so expressed by the one party and agreed 
to by the other is a valid and binding contract, 
which the party not in error may enforce. In other 
words, a party to a contract cannot avoid it on 
the ground that he made a mistake where there 
has been no misrepresentation, there is no am-
biguity in the terms of the contract, and the other 
contractor has no notice of such mistake and acts 
in perfect good faith. A unilateral error, it has 
been said, does not avoid a contract. 
The danger of the doctrine urged by Appellant is 
apparent. Legal relationships would have no sanctity or 
finality if the·y could be abrogated by a subsequent un-
ilateral, self-serving declaration of one of the parties. that 
he did not intend that \vhich he had previously done. 
E'specially is this true if such were permitted after the 
party had died, as it would open up a field of inquiry 
which 1night be subject to rank hearsay. 
We have found no case in which an action attacking 
a joint tenancy agreement was pending at the time of 
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the death of ·one of the joint tenants which was thereafter 
adjudieated. The author, in the annotation at 46 A.L.R. 
~d 91 ~' at page 956, says : 
'l1he mere comrnencing of an action to obtain 
a partition of joint-tenancy property does not 
operate as a severance of the joint tenancy. Dando 
v Dando (1940) 37 Cal App2d 371, 99 P2d 561; 
'l1eutenberg v Schiller (1955) 138 Cal App2d 18, 
291 P2d 53; Ellison v Murphy (1927) 128 l\Iisc 
471, 219 NYS 667. 
"It is not the filing of the partition action 
"\\rhich terminates the joint tenancy, but only the 
judgment in such action'' which has that effect. 
Teutenberg v. Schiller (1955) 138 ·Cal App 2d 18, 
291 P2d 53. 
The foregoing cases involved real property. The author, 
however, cites Child v. Bulmer (Eng. 3 Ch 59), which 
apparently involved bank accounts. The author's state-
ment is: 
In ·Child v Bulmer, where a fund had been 
carried to the separate account of three infants 
as joint tenants, and when the eldest of them at-
tained the age of 21 (thereupon becoming entitled 
to receive one-third of the fund) he proceeded 
through solicitors to obtain payment of his s.hare, 
and accordingly an amended summons was issued 
returnable on the 28th of March, and the parties 
attended on that day, but, owing to the pressure 
of business, the matter was not then reached and 
it was adjourned to April 22, it was held, the 
claimant having died in the interval of delay, 
that since no order was made in the matter and 
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until an order was made the claimant was "com-
pletely master of proceedings" and at liberty to 
discontinue them at any moment if he thought 
fit on paying costs, no severance resulted, and 
his share consequently inured to the others. 
Appellant makes reference to the statement of Jus-
tice ·Cordoza in the concurring opinion in Moskowitz v. 
Th1:arTo\v, 167 N. E. 506, wherein he· says: "The question 
is not here whether a like result would follow if a suit 
to establi:sh an agreement at \var with the presumption 
had then been pending, undetermined.'' (Emphasis 
ours.) 
This Court need have no more concern "\\~ith a pend-
ing suit ''to establish an agree1nent" then did the Court 
of Appeals in the Thfosko\\7"itz case for the Ste,vart com-
p~laint alleges no "agreen~ent." It contains nothing other 
than allegations of conclusions of law, unilateral mistake, 
and self-serving declarations, nor does it purport to at-
tack the joint tenancy agree1nents on the ground of fraud, 
duress, n1istake of fact, undue influence or otherwise. 
It does not state a cause of action, and the joint tenancy 
agree1nents are uni1npaired thereby. 
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CONCLUSION 
The intention to create joint tenancy agreements is 
elearly expressed in the written signature cards. This 
Court is bound by the agreement of the pHrties. The-
joint tenancy agreements were not destroyed by notice 
to the loan companies nor by the Stewart action. Res-
pondent is entitled to the funds as surviving joint tenant. 
Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respecfully submitted, 
Harold R. Boyer 
Of ROMNEY, BOYER AND RONNOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
